The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016

Purpose of the bill:

• The Bill intends to provide for targeted delivery of subsidies and services to individuals residing in India by assigning them unique identity numbers, called Aadhaar numbers.
• The requirement of Aadhaar’s statutory existence came up due to recent Supreme Court judgments where it quashed Aadhaar as unconstitutional and turned it from being mandatory to voluntary. The major policies and services introduced by the Government got held up with that judgment.

Key provisions:

• Information to be submitted: To obtain an Aadhaar number, an individual has to submit his, (i) biometric (photograph, fingerprint, iris scan) and (ii) demographic (name, date of birth, address) information.
• Enrolment: At the time of enrolment, the individual will be informed of, (i) the manner in which the information will be used, (ii) the nature of recipients with whom the information will be shared, and (iii) the right to access this information.
• Use of Aadhaar number: To verify the identity of a person receiving a subsidy or a service, the government may require them to have an Aadhaar number. If a person does not have an Aadhaar number, the government will require them to apply for it, and in the meanwhile, provide an alternative means of identification. Aadhaar number cannot be proof of citizenship.
• Composition of Unique identification authority: The UID authority will consist of a chairperson, two part-time members, and a chief executive officer. The chairperson and members are required to have experience of at least ten years in matters such as technology, governance, etc.
• Authentication: The UID authority will authenticate the Aadhar number of an individual if an entity makes such a request. A requesting entity (an agency or person that wants to authenticate information of a person) has to obtain the consent of an individual before collecting his information. The agency can use the disclosed information only for purposes for which the individual has given consent.
• Response to authentication query: The UID authority shall respond to an authentication query with a positive, negative, or other appropriate response. However, it is not permitted to share an individual’s fingerprint, iris scan, and other biological attributes.
• Protection of information: Biometric information (specified by regulations) will be used only for Aadhaar enrolment and authentication, and for no other purpose. Such information will not be shared with anyone, nor will it be displayed publicly, except for purposes specified by regulations.
• Cases when information may be revealed: In two cases, information may be revealed: ->In the interest of national security, a Joint Secretary in the central government may issue a direction for revealing, (i) Aadhaar number, (ii) biometric information (iris scan, fingerprint and other biological attributes specified by regulations), (iii) demographic information, and (iv) photograph. Such a decision will be reviewed by an Oversight Committee (comprising Cabinet Secretary, Secretaries of Legal Affairs and Electronics and Information Technology) and will be valid for six months. On the order of a court, (i) an individual’s Aadhaar number, (ii) photograph, and (iii) demographic information, may be revealed.
• Offenses and penalties: A person may be punished with imprisonment up to three years and a minimum fine of Rs 10 lakh for unauthorized access to the centralized database, including revealing any information stored in it. If a requesting entity and an enrolling agency fail to comply with rules, they shall be punished with imprisonment up to one year or a fine upon 10,000 or Rs one lakh (in case of a company), or with both.
• Cognizance of offence: No court shall take cognizance of any offence except on a complaint made by the UID authority or a person authorised by it. Issues and analysis:
• At the time of the introduction of the Bill, the government stated that “the Bill confines itself only to governmental expenditure.” However, the Bill also allows private persons to use Aadhaaras as proof of identity for any purpose.
• Aadhaar may be in violation of the right to privacy. A five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court is examining whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right.
• Provisions regulating disclosure of private information under the Bill differ from guidelines specified under another law — The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Bill differs from the guidelines for phone tapping in two ways. First, the Bill permits sharing in the interest of ‘national security’ rather than for public emergency or public safety. Second, the order can be issued by an officer of the rank of Joint Secretary, instead of a Home Secretary.
• Potential to profile individuals: The Bill does not specifically prohibit law enforcement and intelligence agencies from using the Aadhaar number as a link (key) across various datasets (such as telephone records, air travel records, etc.) in order to recognise patterns of behaviour.
• A provision says, “Courts cannot take cognizance of any offense punishable under the Act unless a complaint is made by the UID authority or a person authorized by it.” This may present a conflict of interest, as under the Bill the UID authority is responsible for the security and confidentiality of identity information and authentication records. There may be situations in which members or employees of the UID authority are responsible for a security breach.
• The Bill empowers the UID authority to specific demographic information that may be collected. The only restriction imposed on the authority is that it shall not record information pertaining to race, religion, caste, language, records of entitlements, income or health of the individual. This power will allow the authority to collect additional personal information, without prior approval from Parliament.
• The bill permits the government to access the database if a district judge orders disclosure of information. This is very dangerous if one bears in mind that we have inadequately trained district judges all over the country. District judges can now authorise access to Aadhaar data without any disclosure or discussion with the citizen affected — only the Aadhaar authority will have the right to contest the order if it is so inclined. While the intention of the Government is to better target beneficiaries of welfare schemes, the privacy of the citizens of the nation will have to be given paramount importance and respect.